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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 970174 
v. : 
JEFFREY EARL SOUTH, and : Priority No. 12 
DIANNA SOUTH, : 
Defendants/Petitioners. : 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals properly determine that a clerical error in a search 
warrant does not automatically render the warrant invalid where the warrant explicitly 
incorporates the supporting affidavit and that affidavit not only requests permission to search the 
area that was searched but also plainly establishes probable cause to search the area in dispute? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The State relies on no constitutional provisions or statutes. The State relies on the 
following court rule: 
Utah R. App. P. 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. 
The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will 
be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision 
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on 
the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question 
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision 
that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; 
or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question 
of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
OPINION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED 
The opinion that petitioners ask this Court to review is State v. Soyth 932 P.2d 622 
(Utah App. 1997) (hereinafter "South HI"), a copy of which is attached as addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Detective Dennis Simonson of the Logan Police Department went to the petitioners' 
home to investigate the reported theft of a cellular phone. Upon his arrival, the detective smelled 
the heavy odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the petitioners' home and from Jeffrey South's 
clothing. South TTT. 932 P.2d at 623. 
Simonson obtained a search warrant to search the persons present at the petitioners' 
home and the home itself. While the supporting affidavit made clear that permission to search the 
petitioners' home had been requested, the warrant itself authorized a search of "the persons of 
2 
JEFFREY AND DIANNA SOUTH" and other persons located at petitioners' home. LL at 623-
24. The warrant then provided the street address of petitioners' home and a description of its 
appearance. Simonson, accompanied by several other officers, conducted a search of petitioners' 
residence. The officers found controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. I$L 
Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence seized from their home on the ground that 
the warrant authorized only a search of their persons, not their residence. The trial court 
determined that the warrant "through inadvertence" failed to authorize a search of petitioners' 
home and was therefore invalid. It nonetheless denied the motion to suppress on the ground that 
the search was proper under the plain smell exception to the warrant requirement. Following their 
convictions, petitioners appealed. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding that the search was proper 
under the plain smell exception. State v. South. 885 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah App. 1994) 
(hereinafter "SQUtLT). After refusing to consider the State's alternative argument for affirming 
petitioners' convictions - that the warrant was valid despite its technical defect - the Court of 
Appeals reversed petitioners' convictions. IJL at 795-97. The State sought and obtained certiorari 
review on the question of whether the Court of Appeals improperly refused to consider its 
alternative ground for affirmance. This Court determined the Court of Appeals erred and 
remanded the case for consideration of whether the search could be supported based on the 
warrant. State V, South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) (hereinafter "South TTY 
In its opinion below, the Court of Appeals determined that the "clerical error" that 
resulted in the omission of petitioners' home from the warrant did not invalidate the warrant 
because the "warrant specifically referred to and incorporated Detective Simonson's affidavit, 
3 
which was submitted to and signed by the judge issuing the warrant.* South in. 932 P.2d at 625. 
Because the affidavit established probable cause to believe controlled substances were located at 
petitioners' home, sought permission to search petitioners' home, and was signed by the issuing 
magistrate, the Court of Appeals determined that the warrant was intended to authorize a search 
of petitioners' home. LL at 6256-26. Because the officers executing the search warrant "were 
able to identify the area to be searched with reasonable effort," the Court of Appeals deemed the 
search of petitioners' home proper. IdL Petitioners now seek certiorari review of that ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
THE OPINION BELOW DOES NOT MERIT CERTIORARI 
REVIEW BECAUSE IT IS FACT SENSITIVE AND WAS 
RESOLVED UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF 
LAW PREVIOUSLY ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT 
A writ of certiorari "will be granted only for special and important reasons." Utah 
R. App. P. 46. It is clear from the illustrative categories identified in subsections (a) through (d) 
of the rule that the purpose of certiorari is not to have the Supreme Court to sit as a court of 
ultimate error-correction, but rather to address significant legal questions of wide application. 
Petitioners' challenge to the opinion below presents no such question. Their claims are fact 
specific and have no continuing importance beyond this case. 
Petitioners do not allege that the Court of Appeals' opinion is in conflict with 
prevailing case law or that the court misread any opinion upon which it based its decision. In 
sum, petitioners do not question the Court of Appeals' interpretation of existing case law, they 
simply disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the search of their home was supported 
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by a duly issued search warrant which, though technically flawed, was intended to authorize a 
search of their residence. 
As the Court of Appeals emphasized, this Court has made clear that "technical 
deficiencies in a search warrant's description of the place to be searched do not necessarily 
invalidate the warrant." SQUHLHI, 932 P.2d at 624 (citing State v. Kellv. 718 P.2d 385, 392 
(Utah 1986); State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985); State v. Mclntire. 768 P.2d 
970, 972-73 (Utah App. 1989)). Rather, the requirement that a search warrant "particularly 
describe" the person or place to be searched is satisfied "if the description is such that the officer 
with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended [to be 
searched]." SQUULHL 932 P.2d at 624 (quoting Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102. (quoting in turn 
Steele v. United States. 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S. Ct. 414, 416 (1925))). Where a search warrant 
specifically refers to the affidavit in support of the petition for a warrant, it is appropriate to 
consider the affidavit in determining whether the warrant sufficiently identified the place intended 
to be search. South m. 932 P.2d at 625 (citing Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102). Factors to 
consider include whether the affidavit demonstrated that the officer had probable cause to search 
the area in question and whether a warrant to search the area was requested. I$L (citing 
Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102-03). Whether the affiant completed or participated in executing the 
search should also be considered. LL 
In this case, it is undisputed that a clerical error resulted in the omission of permission 
to search petitioners' home from the warrant even though the home was identified in the warrant 
by its street address and a detailed description. South m. 932 P.2d at 625. The affidavit 
supporting the search warrant established probable cause to search petitioners' home, and 
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permission to search the home was in fact requested. I$L Finally, Detective Simonson 
participated in the execution of the search warrant and it is undisputed the officers were able to 
identify the area to be search with reasonable effort as evidenced by the fact that they in fact 
searched petitioners' home and not some other location. I$L 
Perhaps most importantly, the issuing magistrate signed the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant. IJL By signing an affidavit that established probable cause to search petitioners' 
residence and requested permission to do so, the issuing magistrate evidenced an intent to 
authorize a search of petitioners' home. I$L The mere fact that a "clerical error" resulted in the 
warrant being poorly worded does not invalidate the warrant. Instead, relying on well-established 
case law from both this Court and the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals 
properly determined that the warrant, though flawed, was not invalid. The supporting affidavit, 
which was incorporated into the warrant by reference, made clear that petitioners' house was 
within the scope of the search warrant. I$L 
The unusual facts of this case are not likely to recur. More importantly, the legal 
principles for resolving this case and those of a similar ilk have already been well-defined by this 
Court and the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, the likelihood that this Court's analysis of 
the facts presented would differ from that provided by the Court of Appeals is virtually nil. 
6 
Because review of the opinion below will not significantly enhance the development of law, 
certiorari review is not warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the writ should not issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / g ^ f c y of May, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. UTZpraj 
Assistant Attorney^General 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief in Opposition 
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed by first class mail this / ^ t B y of May, 1997 to 
the following: 
DIANNA SOUTH 
237 East 200 North 
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Motison court did not precisely describe 
what action, if any, the sentencing trial court 
took in regard to restitution. Monson *s lan-
guage accords the Board broad authority to 
order restitution as a condition of parole 
under both the Utah Constitution and statu-
tory provisions." I agree that Man son does 
not reveal the sentencing trial court's action, 
if any, taken in regard to restitution. As a 
result, I do not believe that the Board's 
authority under Monson extends, for exam-
ple, to a circumstance where the trial court 
made *n affirmative ruling on restitution. 
As noted in Stilling v. Utah Board of 
Pardon*. 950818, — P.2d (Utah App. 
Jan. 24, 2997) (Davis, P.J.. concurring in 
remit) "where the criminal trial court has 
failed lo meet its statutorily imposed judicial 
duty to address restitution at the time of 
sentencing, the Board does not*violate the 
separation of powers provision of the Utah 
Constitution by imposing restitution as a con-
dition of parole." Id at 9-10. at ; 
see r//v; Utah Const, art. V, § 1 HNJo 
person charged with the exercise of powers 
proper 1\ belonging to [one of the three dis-
tinct branches of government], shall exercise 
any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted."). 
As in Stilling, this case does not involve an 
instance in which the Board is imposing a 
condition of restitution on an inmate's parole 
in direct contravention to a sentencing 
court's affirmative determination to the con-
trary. Although the parties recommended 
that petitioner receive no prison time and 
that no restitution be ordered, the record 
does not reveal that the trial court made an 
affirmative determination not to order resti-
tution. Indeed, the trial court affirmatively 
rejected the parties' recommendations with 
reference to prison and made no restitution 
determination under the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (3)(b) (1S90) (current 
version at Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (8)(a)-
(d) (Supp.1996)); see oho State v. Ha$ton> 
811 P.2d 929, 936 (Utah App.1991) (discuss-
ing mandatory requirement that restitution 
be addressed on record at time of sentenc-
ing), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 
(Utah 1993). As a result, it was appropriate 
for the Board to order restitution in this cas< 
notwithstanding Momon. 
However, because the Monson restitutio! 
analysis does not address separation of pow 
ers, I believe it is inappropriate to assunn 
the Utah Supreme Court had before it a casi 
in which the sentencing court explicitly rule* 
on the restitution issue. Also, because thi 
Monson court did not consider separation u 
powers, it is inappropriate to presume th4: 
the supreme court vested the Board wit 
over broad authority to order restitution as , 
parole condition, and the facts of this case d 
not require such an expansive interpretation 
of Monson. Accordingly, inasmuch as th 
majority opinion interprets Monson as al 
fording the Board broad authority in orde» 
ing parole conditions, without extending *h, 
interpretation to instances where the tris 
court expressly considered restitutio!] at th 
time of sentencing, I concur. 
( O f <l>NUM6t*S>SUM> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee 
v. 
Jeffery Earl SOUTH and Dianna South 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 930362-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 30, 1997. 
Defendants were convicted in the Fir 
Circuit Court, Cache County, Burton H H^ 
lis, J., of possession of a controlled substan 
and possession of drug paraphernalia with 
1000 feet of a church, and they appealc 
The Court of Appeals. 885 P.2d 795. v 
versed, and state petitioned for writ of certi 
rari. The Supreme Court, 924 P.2d 3" 
reversed and remanded. On remand, t 
Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held th; 
(1) police officers did not exceed scope 
search warrant when they searched deft 
dants' residence pursuant to wanaiu autr 
STATE v. 
Cite as 932 P.2d 622 
rizing search of "the person of defendants, 
but (2) distance element of statute providing 
heightened sentence for drug-related crimes 
committed within 1000 feet of a church was 
element of underlying drug offenses that 
state was required to prove beyond reason-
able doubt. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
1. Drugs and Narcotics ^lSSKU 
Police officers did not exceed scope of 
search warrant when they searched defen-
dants' residence pursuant to warrant autho-
rizing search of "the person of" defendants, 
where search warrant affidavit stated that 
police officer had probable cause to suspect 
presence of controlled substance at defen-
dants' address, warrant expressly incorporat-
ed affidavit, and affiant was among officers 
executing warrant. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 
4. 
2. Drugs and Narcotics <3=>133 
Distance element of statute providing 
heightened sentence for drug-related crimes 
committed within 1000 feet of a church was 
element of underlying drug offenses that 
state was required to prove beyond reason-
able doubt. U.C A.1953, 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix). 
Kathryn D. Kendell, American Civil Liber-
ties Union of Utah Foundation, Inc., Salt 
Lake City, and Nathan Hult, Logan, for De-
fendants and Appellants. 
Jan Graham, Attorney General, and Todd 
A. Utzinger, Assistant Attorney, Salt Lake 
City, and Gary O. McKean, Cache County 
Attorney, Jeffrey "Rw Burbank and Patrick 
B. Nolan, Cache Deputy County Attorneys, 
Logan, for Plaintiff and Appellee. 




The State seeks affirmance of the convic-
tions of Jeffery Earl and Diknna South of 
possession of a controlled substance within 
SOUTH Utah 623 
(UtahApp. 1997) 
1000 feet of a church, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, class A misdemeanors, in vio-
lation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 and 58-
37a-5 (1994), on the ground that the trial 
court erred in concluding the search of the 
Souths' home exceeded the scope of the 
search warrant. The trial court determined 
that the search executed exceeded the war-
rant's scope because the warrant permitted 
only a search of "the person of Jeffery and 
Dianna South," and not a search of their 
personal residence. However, the trial court 
upheld the search on other grounds. Defen-
dants challenge the trial court's imposition of 
an enhanced sentence. We affirm the con-
victions, but reverse and remand in regard to 
the sentence enhancements. 
BACKGROUND 
This case is before us on remand from the 
Utah Supreme Court. State v. South, 92A 
?2d 354, 357 (Utah 1996). The criminal 
charges against the Souths arose out of a 
search warrant executed on March 15, 1992, 
by Detective Dennis Simonson of the Logan 
City Police Department. Initially, Detective 
Simonson visited defendants' personal resi-
dence to investigate the reported theft of a 
cellular phone. Upon arrival, Detective Si-
monson smelled a heavy odor of burnt mari-
juana emanating from defendants* home and 
from Jeffery South's clothing. 
Detective Simonson proceeded to obtain a 
search warrant, which authorized a search of 
"the persons of Jeffery Earl and Dianna 
South." The search warrant specifically ref-
erenced a supporting affidavit that explicitly 
referenced a search of defendants' personal 
residence. Detective Simonson served the 
search warrant upon defendants and with the 
assistance of several other officers, com-
menced a search of the South residence. 
The officers found controlled substances and 
drug paraphernalia. 
Defendants were subsequently charged 
with possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia within 1000 
feet of a church. Prior to trial, defendants 
moved to suppress the evidence found in 
their residence, claiming it was seized in an 
illegal search and seizure. Defendants as-
624 Utah 932 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
serted that the search warrant was detective 
because it authorized only a search of the 
"persons of Jeffery Earl and Dianna South," 
and not of their personal residence. In de-
nying defendants' motion to suppress, the 
trial court ruled that although the search 
warrant was defective, the evidence was ad-
missible under the plain smell doctrine.1. 
Defendants were adjudged guilty of pos-
session of a controlled substance and posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia. At sentencing, 
the trial court determined that the posses-
sion of a controlled substance offense was 
committed within 1000 feet of a church, in 
this instance, the Logan Temple of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
Defendants then appealed to this court. 
We declined to apply the plain smell doc-
trine to personal residences and determined 
that a warrant was required to search defen-
dants' home and that exigent circumstances 
for a warrantless search were not present. 
State v. South, 885 P.2d 795. 799-800 (Utah 
App.1994). We further declined to address 
the State's alternative ground for affirmance, 
scope of the search warrant, because the 
State had failed to cross-appeal this issue, 
and reversed defendants' convictions. Id. at 
798. 
The State then petitioned for and was 
granted a writ of certiorari by the Utah 
Supreme Court. See Stole v. South 924 P.2d 
354 (Utah 1996). The supreme court held 
that even though the State did not cross-
appeal the validity of the search, this court, 
should have considered that alternative 
ground for affirmance of the convictions be-
low, which the State had argued in its brief 
to this court.2 The supreme court remanded 
the case to this court to determine the law-
fulness of the search under the warrant. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review for correctness the trial court's 
legal conclusions on motions to suppress. 
1. See. e.g.. State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969. 972 
(Utah App.1992) (upholding warrantless search 
of vehicle where plain smell of marijuana gave 
officers probable cause). 
2. The supreme court did not address the applica-
bility of the plain smell doctrine to personal 
residences. 
See State it I'ena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1994). We will overturn the trial court V 
underlying factual findings only if those find-
ings are clearly erroneous. Id at 939 n. 4 
ANALYSIS 
I. Validity of Search Executed 
[1] A search warrant must "particularly 
describe!) the person or place to be searched 
and the person, property, or evidence to be 
seized." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203 (1995) 
(emphasis added)/* The particularity re-
quirement is satisfied " 'if the description is 
such that the officer with a search warrant 
can tvith reasonable effort ascertain and iden-
tify the place intended.' " State v. Anderson, 
701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985) (quoting 
Steele v. United States, 2G7 U.S. 498, 503, 45 
S.Ct. 414, 416, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925)). This 
reading of the particularity requirement pro-
tects two concerns. First, it promotes the 
deterrence of " 'general, exploratory rum-
maging in a person's belongings.'" Andre-
sex v. Maryland. 427 U.S. 463, 480, % S.Ct. 
2737, 274<S, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (quoting 
Cooltdge r. Xcic Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443. 
467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038. 29 L.Ed.2d 564 
(1971)). Second, the scope of the lawful 
search is limited to " 'the places in which 
there is probable cause to believe that it [the 
evidence] may be found."* Maryland v. 
Garrison 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 
1016, 94 L.Ed2d 72 (1937) (quoting United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798. 824, 102 S.Ct. 
2157. 2172, 72 L.Eci.2d 572 (19*2)). 
Utah courts have held that technical defi-
ciencies in a search warrant's description of 
the place to be searched do not necessarily 
invalidate the warrant. E.g., State v. Kelly, 
718 P2d 3S5, 392 (Utah 1986) (holding war-
rant and search valid where one of number of 
warrants contained incorrect street number 
because correct address appeared on at-
tached affidavit as well as other related war-
3. The current version of this section is substan-
tially the same as that in effect at the time this 
issue arose. The 1994 amendment, effective May 
2. 1994. made merely minor stylistic changes. 
STATE v. 
Cite as 932 P.2d 622 
rants and affidavits); Anderson, 701 P.2d at 
1103; State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 972-73 
(Utah App.1989) (holding affidavit clarified 
ambiguity that both residence and blue trail-
er, not just residence, as described in search 
warrant, were proper subjects of search). In 
Anderson, an informant told a police officer 
that defendant's property contained a fenced 
area used for cultivating maryuana. 701 
P.2d at 1100. The officer obtained a search 
warrant that authorized the search of defen-
dant's "residence." Id The warrant, howev-
er, made no reference to the fenced enclo-
sure, which was located about 100 feet north 
of defendant's house. Id at 1100, 1102. In 
executing the search warrant, the police 
searched only the enclosed area, where they 
discovered over 100 marijuana plants. Id at 
1100. Defendant argued that the search ex-
ceeded the warrant's scope. Id at 1102. 
In considering the warrant's scope, the 
supreme court emphasized that the warrant 
specifically referred to the affidavit in sup-
port of the petition for a warrant. Id The 
affidavit clearly showed that the officer had 
probable cause to search the enclosed area, 
and that he had requested a warrant to 
search that specific area. Id at 1102-03. 
Finally, the affiant was the very officer who 
executed the search warrant Id at 1103. 
Relying on case law that also considered 
these factors, the court concluded: 
We find this logic persuasive because it 
limits the search to the confines contem-
plated by the magistrate authorizing the 
warrant, while not invalidating searches 
because of minor technical deficiencies in 
the warrant's description Because the 
area searched (the enclosure) was the area 
for which probable cause had been made 
out, and the affidavit adequately identified 
that area, the search was valid. 
Id (emphasis added). 
In this case, a clerical error resulted in the 
omission of defendants' home from the war-
rant's description. Defendants argue that 
this omission is more than a mere technical 
deficiency. Defendants' argument is unper-
suasive, however, as this court has, relying 
on Anderson, upheld the search of a house 
and trailer where the warrant omitted any 
reference to the house itself. Mclntire, 768 
SOUTH Utah 625 
(UtahApp. 1997) 
P.2d at 972-73 (relying on supporting affida-
vit to clarify proper scope of search); see 
also State u Kleinberg, 22S Neb. 128, 421 
N.W.2d 450, 451-55 (1988) (relying on sup-
porting affidavit to uphold search despite 
warrant's inadvertent identification of defen-
dant, rather than defendant's automobile, as 
subject of search). 
The evidence in this case demonstrates 
that the officers executing the warrant "were 
able to identify the area to be searched with 
reasonable effort." Mclntire, 768 P.2d at 
973. The warrant specifically referred to 
and incorporated Detective Simonson's affi-
davit, which was submitted to and signed by 
the judge issuing the warrant. In particular, 
the warrant stated that probable cause to 
search was "more fully set forth in the affida-
vit, a copy of which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herewith." Although the rec-
ord suggests that, at the time of the search, 
the affidavit was not attached to the warrant, 
Mclntire requires only that the warrant spe-
cifically refer to the affidavit. Id; see also 
United States u Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1291 
(7th Cir.) (upholding warrant "when an affi-
davit attached to the warrant or incorporated 
into it provides the necessary specificity"), 
cert denied, — U.S. , 116 S.Ct. 263,133 
L.Ed.2d 186 (1995); People v. Papez, 652 
P.2d 619, 622 (Colo.App.1982) (stating federal 
constitution does not require attachment of 
affidavit). 
Furthermore, the affidavit clearly stated 
that Detective Simonson had probable cause 
to suspect the presence of controlled sub-
stances "at the premises of 237 East 200 
North, Logan, Utah," defendants' address. 
Based on this probable cause, the affidavit 
specifically supported a warrant to search 
defendants' home. Therefore, in signing the 
affidavit and search warrant, the magistrate 
must have determined that Detective Simon-
son had probable cause for the search of 
defendants' home. See Anderson, 701 P.2d 
at 1102; Mclntire, 768 V2A at 972-73; see 
also United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 
759 (2d Cir.1984) (stating that one objective 
of particularity requirement is to prevent 
"seizure of objects upon the mistaken as-
sumption that they fall within the magis-
trate's authorization"), cert denied, 470 U.S. 
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1084, 105 S.Ct 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985); 
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.5, 
at 513 (3d ed.1996) (noting that particularity 
requirement reduces risk that police will 
"search a place other than the place intended 
by the magistrate"). The probable cause in 
this case was "particularized" to include not 
only defendants' person, but also their home. 
Cf. State t\ Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah 
App.1988), cert., denied, 773 P2d 45 (Utah 
1989). 
In addition, because the officers limited 
their search to defendants' person and home, 
as contemplated by the search warrant and 
supporting affidavit, their search did not ex-
ceed the magistrate's authorization. See 
Anderson 701 P.2d at 1102. Therefore, "the 
area searched . . . was the area for which 
probable cause had been made out." Id, at 
1103; see also State v. Nicholson, 174 Wis.2d 
542, 497 N.W.2d 791, 794 (1993) (upholding 
search as "tailored to the justification offered 
in the warrant" where search "focused on 
[defendant's] apartment, the very premises 
which the officers sought judicial permission 
to search"). 
Finally. Detective Simonson, the affiant in 
this case, was among the officers who execut-
ed the warrant. Detective Simonson had 
acquired probable cause, prepared the affida-
vit, submitted the affidavit to the judge for 
issuance of the warrant, and executed the 
warrant. See Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102-
03; Mclutire, 768 P.2d at 972-73; see also 
United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 
1499 (6th Cir.) (upholding search because 
"affiant who describe[d] the property to the 
judge" was among executing officers), cert 
denied, 492 U.S. 918, 109 S.Ct. 3242, 106 
L.Ed.2d 590 (1989); Stale v. Pruitt, 97 Ohio 
App.3d 258, 646 N.E.2d 547, 550 (1994) (up-
holding search where same officer "both ap-
plied for and executed the warrant, thus 
rendering a mistaken search unlikely"). 
Defendants contend, however, that any 
other officer besides the affiant could not 
have ascertained with reasonable effort that 
defendants' home was subject to the warrant. 
Defendants fail to recognize that the warrant 
expressly incorporated the affidavit, in which 
Detective Simonson had clearly established 
probable cause and requested a warrant to 
search defendants' home. Thus, with reasc 
able effort, any other officer could have c 
termined through reviewing the supportii 
documents that defendants' home was su 
ject to the warrant. Cf. Buckner v. Unit 
Suites, 615 A.2d 1154, 1156 (D.C.App.l9S 
(relying on facts not specified in either wa 
rant or affidavit, but known to officers ex 
cuting warrant). 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Cou 
has stated that "[t]he adequacy of a descri] 
tion in a search warrant depends in evei 
instance upon the particular facts of tl 
case." Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102; see ah 
Mclntire, 768 P.2d at 972. In noting th; 
the affiant in Anderson had executed th 
warrant, the supreme court emphasized th 
importance of the actual circumstances sui 
rounding the search, rather than hypothetic, 
possibilities. 701 P.2d at 1102-03; see ah 
Stale v. Bokan. 72 Wash.App. 335, 864 P.2 
26, 28 (1993) (stating that proper test it 
"given the actual facts of a given case, ca 
the officer who actually executes the warran 
by reasonable effort find and determine 
proper subject of search "without having t< 
resort to guess work"), rev. denied. 12 
Wash.2d 1002, 877 P.2d 1287 (1994). 
In conclusion, the police established proba 
ble cause to search defendants' home, when 
the evidence was seized, and the affidavit 
bearing the signature of the judge, clearh 
identified their home as a proper subject o 
the search. Therefore, under Utah law, the 
search executed was valid. The trial couri 
properly denied defendants' motion to sup-
press the marijuana and drug paraphernalia 
found in their home because the evidence 
was not seized in an illegal search and sei-
zure. 
II. Sentencing Provision 
[2] Defendants contend that Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(5Ka)(L\) (Supp.1993), which 
provides a heightened sentence for certain 
drug-related crimes committed within 1000 
feet of a church, acts as an element of their 
offenses. Defendants further argue that the 
State failed to present evidence regarding 
this element at trial. The State responds 
that this provision constitutes a sentencing 
STATE v. 
Cite as 932 P.2d 622 
ncement, not an element of the offense 
the State must prove at trial. 
ds court has recently held that the provi-
5 of section 58-37-8(5) constitute an addi-
il element for the underlying offenses, to 
letermined by the trier of fact at trial. 
e v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146, 150 (Utah 
1.1996); see also State v. Stromberg, 783 
I 54, 60 (Utah App.1989) (identifying 
0-feet provision as an "additional ele-
lt" of crime), cert denied, 795 F2d 1138 
ah 1990). Therefore, the State had the 
•den to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
distance element under section 58-37-
)(a)(ix). At trial, the State failed to offer 
dence regarding the distance between de-
idants' home and the Logan Temple. Ac-
rdingly, defendants' sentences under this 
ovision should be reversed and the matter 
manded to the trial court for resentencing. 
Under State v Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1211 
(Utah 1993), appellate courts "may enter judg-





We reverse defendants' convictions for 
possession of a controlled substance within 
1000 feet of a church; affirm the convictions 
for possession of drug paraphernalia; enter 
judgments of conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance;4 and remand the case 
to the trial court to impose sentences for the 
controlled substance convictions. 
DAVIS, P.J., and BENCH, J., concur. 
( O | « Y NUMBER SYSTEM > 
has tainted the conviction for the greater of-
fense " 
